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his paper investigates the problem of harmonization 
between freedom of information and the economic 
interests of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs), especially in 
light of the Brazilian legal framework. Since that topic has hardly 
been object of academic discussion so far, the paper is limited to 
an initial approach, based on preliminary findings of the research 
on ‘economic secrets in State-Owned Enterprises’. 
The challenge lies in limiting secrecy to exceptional 
circumstances, thus preventing it from becoming the rule. In 
order to face that challenge, it is fundamental to draw on the 
experience acquired by handling secrets related to national 
security, which is the typical exception to freedom of information, 
alongside with the protection of private data. 
First, the above mentioned problem will be extend, indicating in 
further detail why trade secrets in SOEs are a relevant challenge 
to freedom of information. The following section argues that the 
democratic supervision of SOEs can learn from the experience of 
national security secrecy, which is performed mainly through the 
development of accountability procedures which restrain the 
discretionary power of authorities. The final section highlights the 
absence of such procedural elements in the regulation of trade 
secrets in SOEs.  
§ 1 – TRANSPARENCY IN STATE-OWNED 
ENTERPRISES: BETWEEN PRIVATE AND PUBLIC 
Unlike most of other forms of government organizations, State-
Owned Enterprises are characterized by their hybrid public-
private nature. Public as a consequence of its control by the 
government, which usually defines the ultimate goals of the 
company, such as steering relevant and strategic markets – energy, 
infrastructure, transportation, finances – or providing public 
services for the population. The private aspect of the SOEs, on 
the other hand, is usually connected to its organization in the 
form of a company, which means they are at least partly profit-
oriented and often rely on capital from private shareholders.  
Because of those hybrid features, designing the legal framework 
in which SOEs should operate proves to be specially challenging, 
since it must not only protect the public interest underlying the 
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creation of the enterprise – which includes the company’s 
competitiveness and successful economic performance –, but also 
take into account the private interests of minority shareholders. 
That’s why many of the general provisions applicable to 
government bodies are seen as inadequate for SOEs, which 
usually require greater flexibility in order to operate in 
competitive market economies.  
Transparency rules are a good example of the difficulty in 
harmonizing the public and private aspects of SOEs. In the 
public sector, full transparency is increasingly regarded as the 
ultimate goal, and in the last few decades democratic 
governments have made significant efforts to grant access to all 
information held by public bodies1. After all, Bobbio famously 
defined democracy as ‘the rule of public power in public’ (1984). 
In private enterprises, on the other hand, secrecy is still 
considered the natural option and the disclosure of information is 
tightly controlled. After all, information is an increasingly valuable 
resource and its possession can result in a relevant competitive 
advantage. Companies that wish to survive in a competitive 
environment must therefore protect themselves from unwanted 
disclosure of information, which can negatively affect their 
economic performance. 
It is not clear how transparency rules ought to be applied in 
SOEs, as they are located in the threshold between public and 
private sector. Should they aim at full transparency, enabling 
citizens to evaluate their policies and performances? Or would it 
be better to treat strategic information as an asset, limiting 
disclosure to tightly controlled circumstances? Those questions 
can be answered in at least three different ways. 
 The First Option: Full Disclosure A)
The first course of action available is not to recognize trade 
secrets held by SOEs as a legitimate exception to freedom of 
information. In this scenario, transparency prevails over the 
economic interest of the company, which is thus compelled to 
disclose any relevant information to the public, no matter the 
harm it may cause to the activities performed by the enterprise. 
It is important to remember, however, that the successful 
economic performance of the SOE is in the public interest. First 
of all, due to the public resources invested in creating and 
maintaining the enterprise, so that the company’s losses are also 
government’s losses. Secondly, if there are no prospects of 
financial returns, private partners are less willing to invest in the 
company, thus threatening the very existence of many SOEs.  
Since information has an undeniable strategic value in today’s 
economy, to impose on SOEs the indiscriminate disclosure of 
                                                
1 A good example of such efforts is the Open Government Partnership (OGP), a 2011 
initiative aimed at making national and subnational governments more open, 
accountable, and responsive to citizens. Originally with eight members, OGP has grown 
to seventy five participating countries by the end of 2016. 
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information would surely impair their ability to operate effectively 
in competitive markets and, consequently, their economic 
efficiency. Of course the world of SOEs is very diverse, and many 
of them do not face any actual competition nor do they rely on 
private shareholders. In those cases, one could arguably give up 
trade secrets in favor of public transparency without causing any 
significant damages to the company’s results. At the other 
extreme, however, there are many SOEs that do operate in highly 
competitive global markets (KOWALSKI ET AL., 2013) and in 
which private shareholders play an important role.  
For that reason, even though a conceivable alternative, it is 
extremely unlikely that SOEs (or lawmakers) simply waive the 
right to withhold strategic information for the sake of 
transparency,2 even though in specific scenarios it may be 
possible to adjust the rules to the market conditions in which the 
company operates.  
 The Second Option: Exemption B)
If trade secrets are an unavoidable reality, a second alternative in 
dealing with the dilemma is to exempt SOEs from transparency 
obligations applicable to other government bodies, especially 
those related to freedom of information. According to the Global 
Right to Information Rating, developed by Access Euro3, among 
the 111 countries with Access to Information legislation, 22 do 
not include SOEs – including Australia, Austria, Belgium, China, 
Denmark, France, Greece, Switzerland, Taiwan and Turkey – and 
other 13 only do it partially – including Canada, Chile, Colombia, 
Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Philippines and South Korea. 
The problem here is that, even though there are legitimate 
reasons for denying access to information held by SOEs when 
this disclosure may be detrimental to the company’s performance, 
the simple exclusion of these companies from the scope of 
freedom of information legislation results in a dangerous gap of 
public accountability, in two different ways.  
First, SOEs seem to provide an environment prone to 
corruption. On the basis of 224 corruption cases, for instance, a 
report by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development concluded that ‘SOE officials were bribed in 27% 
of cases but received 80.11% of total bribes’ (OECD, 2014, 
p.  22). Recent corruption scandals in Brazil illustrate how 
pervasive corruption in SOEs can be. In 2014 an investigation 
task force unveiled a corruption scheme in Petrobras, a state-
owned oil company whose losses have been estimated in over U$ 
6 billion. The same investigation has brought other SOEs under 
                                                
2 For instance, the ‘Model Inter-american Law on Access to Public Information’, 
approved by the Organization of American States (AG/RES. 2607 -XL-O/10), may 
deny access to information when its disclosure ‘would create a clear, probable and 
specific risk of substantial harm, [which should be further defined by law] to […]the 
ability of the State to manage the economy [or] legitimate financial interest of a public 
authority’. 
3 Available at <www.rti-rating.org/>. 
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suspicion, such as Eletronuclear (whose CEO was was sentenced 
to serve 43 years in prison), Eletrobras, the National Bank for 
Economic and Social Development (BNDES), among others. 
The explanation for that apparent connection between SOEs and 
corruption can only be speculated here, but it doesn’t seem far 
stretched to point as plausible reasons (i) the fact that SOEs are 
often charged with carrying out large infrastructure programs; (ii) 
the highly technical fields in which they operate, making outside 
supervision difficult; (iii) the greater flexibility in awarding 
contracts and choosing commercial partners; and (iv) lack of 
transparency. 
Secondly, even if SOEs were absolutely immune to corruption, 
opacity can hinder accountability of elected officials. In many 
cases, the activities of SOEs are a relevant part of the 
government’s political and economical strategies. In recent years, 
for example, Petrobras and BNDES have played a major role in 
furthering the economic policy of the Brazilian federal 
government (MANTEGA, 2005), while Caixa Econômica, another 
public bank, was fundamental for the success of social policies 
such as Programa Bolsa Família (SOARES, 2012). In this scenario, 
secrecy can deprive citizens from relevant information about their 
government’s actions4. Likewise, problems and difficulties in 
providing public services may be hidden from society under the 
pretext of protecting trade secrets. 
The importance of accountability in SOEs should not be 
underestimated. Even though state ownership is not as popular 
and frequent today as it once was, partly due to the large 
privatization programs in the 1980s and 1990s, SOEs can still be 
considered relevant actors in the global economy, especially 
among emerging economies, where state ownership is often seen 
as an important tool in promoting economic growth (KOWALSKI 
ET AL., 2013). Brazil is a good example: in spite of undergoing 
large scale privatization in the last decades, SOEs still play a 
central role both in domestic economy and in public services. In 
2014, the federal government alone controlled 135 companies – 
48 under direct government ownership –, which employed more 
than five hundred thousand people5. In the financial sector, 
roughly half of all credit operations were performed by 
government-owned banks, which are also responsible for 40% of 
all transaction accounts in Brazil (BRASIL, 2015, p. 44). 
In the attempt to hold SOEs accountable to society, transparency 
plays an undisputable role. As highlighted by BOBBIO (1980), the 
government of the economy, unlike traditional power, is 
performed not so much through laws or decrees, but rather 
                                                
4 In 2014, for example, brazilian newspapers indicated that the federal government, 
eager to curb inflation, used Petrobras to control fuel prices. In a year of presidential 
elections, the strategy was extremely controversial and resulted in major losses for the 
company. The government, however, hesitated to admit any interference in Petrobras, 
which denied public access to its pricing policy. 
5 Subnational governments, especially at the state level, also control a relevant number 
of enterprises in a variety of economic areas, such as infrastructure, basic sanitation, 
transport, and so on. 
H arm on i z i n g  F r e e d om  o f  I n f o rm a t i o n  a n d  T r a d e  S e c r e t s  i n  S t a t e  O w n e d  
E n t e r p r i s e :  W hy  P r o c e d u r e s  m a t t e r  –  G u i l h e rm e  S i q u e i r a  D e  C a r v a l h o  
 
– 31 – 
International Journal of Open Government [2018 – Vol 7]  
http://ojs.imodev.org/index.php/RIGO 
through the control of large economical hubs, including SOEs. 
As a result, this form of governmental action frequently eludes 
democratic and judicial review, and that’s a reason why BOBBIO 
calls for a theory of this ‘undergovernment’, aimed at removing it 
from the domains of the ‘invisible power’. BOBBIO’s remarks 
seem as true today as they did thirty years ago, and even after the 
privatization of the 1980s and 1990s state-owned enterprises 
remain too relevant to be left in the shadows. 
 The Third Option: Secrecy as a Legitimate C)
Exception 
If lawmakers are to acknowledge trade secrets in SOEs without 
exempting them from FOI legislation altogether, a middle ground 
must be found. Therefore, the third – and quite obvious – path 
available is to treat the dilemma not as an absolute choice 
between secrecy and transparency, rather as a question about the 
degree of transparency which should be imposed on state owned-
enterprises. After all, sola dosis facit venenum – the dose makes the 
poison. 
The abstract formula that summarizes that scenario would be: 
‘information held by SOEs is public, unless its disclosure may 
harm a legitimate economic interest of the company’. That 
formulation reflects a well known FOI principle according to 
which information is presumed public and access may only be 
denied in limited and exceptional circumstances.6 The structure, 
therefore, is divided in two parts: first, there is the general rule: 
‘all information is public’; then, the exception: ‘unless there is a 
legitimate reason for withholding it’. 
Although very simple at a first glance, the effectiveness of such 
formula hinges on the answer to a delicate question: how do we 
make sure that exception remains an exception? How can we 
guarantee that ‘exceptional’ secrecy is not gradually going to 
expand to the point where it is, de facto, the rule? 
The duality rule/exception must not be regarded (only) 
quantitatively. The ‘proportion’ of data considered secret is a 
relevant indicator, but so is its quality. The fact that a public body 
withholds only 5% of all its documents doesn’t mean per se it 
complies with the general rule of publicity, because those few 
withheld documents may contain all information necessary for an 
effective social control, whereas the remaining 95% could say 
little about the activities carried out by the organization. 
According to BOBBIO (1980), one of the main differences 
between an autocratic and a democratic regime lies in the fact 
                                                
6 According to the Principles on Freedom of Information Legislation, drafted by 
ARTICLE 19 and endorsed by the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and 
Expression in his report to the 2000 session of the United Nations Commission on 
Human Rights (E/CN.4/2000/63), ‘The principle of maximum disclosure establishes a 
presumption that all information held by public bodies should be subject to disclosure 
and that this presumption may be overcome only in very limited circumstances’ 
(available  at <http://bit.ly/1lYHR4n >). For more information on the maximum 
disclosure principle, see MENDEL, 2008. 
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that, in the first, secrecy is the rule, whereas in the latter it is an 
exception regulated by laws which do not allow improper 
extension. In democracies, the exceptionality of secrets proves 
the rule of publicity, as in the old maxim from Cicero: exceptio 
probat regulam in casibus non exceptis. The challenge thus consists in 
designing the laws which regulate secrecy in such a way that it is 
limited to exceptional circumstances, reinforcing the general 
provision of publicity.  
§ 2 – THE REGULATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY 
INFORMATION: THE BRAZILIAN CASE  
The archetypical exception scenario to government transparency, 
alongside with the protection of personal data, is national 
security. There is little, if any, dispute about the legitimacy of 
withholding information for safety purposes, and even the most 
enthusiastic advocates for public transparency acknowledge the 
need of secrecy to some extent whenever the safety of people is 
at stake. Virtually all declarations on the right to information from 
civil society organizations admit that possibility.7  
Evidently, that doesn’t mean that governments should have a carte 
blanche when it comes to national security; on the contrary, the 
need to reconcile publicity and national security actions has been 
the focus of long debates, and attention to this topic has grown in 
the last few years, partly as a consequence of Edward Snowden 
revelations about massive surveillance conducted by intelligence 
agencies. Therefore, if we are to understand which mechanisms 
can be put into place in order to limit secrecy to really exceptional 
circumstances, there is no better way to start than to look at the 
experience acquired by regulation of  secrecy for national security 
purposes. 
As a first step in that direction, in this part I analyze how the 
Brazilian Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)8 regulates the 
withholding of information for security reasons. I do not intend 
to dwell on details, but to present the overall strategy adopted by 
the lawmakers, which I argue can be divided into two 
complementary processes: first, on a conceptual level, there is 
what I call the denaturalization of secrecy; secondly, there is 
proceduralization. 
 The Denatural izat ion  of Secrecy A)
The idea that information held by government agencies is 
presumed public is relatively recent. Until not so long ago, the 
general public only had access to those documents voluntarily 
                                                
7 See ‘The Public's Right to Know: Principles on Freedom of Information Legislation’, mentioned in 
footnote 5, above, as well as ‘The Global Principles on National Security and the Right to 
Information (Tshwane Principles)’, available at <https://osf.to/24OsfjM>, and the ‘Principles 
on the Right of Access to Information’, drafted by the Inter-american Juridical Committee 
(CJI/RES.147 - LXXIII-O/08). 
8 Law n. 12.527, of November 18, 2011. 
H arm on i z i n g  F r e e d om  o f  I n f o rm a t i o n  a n d  T r a d e  S e c r e t s  i n  S t a t e  O w n e d  
E n t e r p r i s e :  W hy  P r o c e d u r e s  m a t t e r  –  G u i l h e rm e  S i q u e i r a  D e  C a r v a l h o  
 
– 33 – 
International Journal of Open Government [2018 – Vol 7]  
http://ojs.imodev.org/index.php/RIGO 
disclosed by the authorities (see SCHUDSON, 2015). Even today, in 
spite of the growing acceptance of the right to information, the 
presumption of publicity is far from being uncontroversial, and 
many officials resist granting access to information solely on 
discretionary grounds. 
In that scenario, confidentiality is the standard situation and 
demands no further justification. No one has to state which 
documents are to be kept away from the public: their secrecy is 
merely an attribute of the information they contain. 
The paradigm shift towards openness changes everything. If 
information is prima facie public, someone must define when and 
on which grounds access should be restricted. This is what I call 
denaturalization, the process through which secrecy is no longer 
seen as the natural state, but as the consequence of a decision by 
an authority. Brazil provides an illustrative example: whereas the 
1991 Law on Archives stated that ‘documents which, if disclosed, 
would endanger the security of society and of the State […] are 
originally confidential’9, the 2011 FOIA established that 
information must be classified by competent authorities in order 
to be considered as secret. 
Information may only be legitimately withheld, therefore, when it 
is duly classified, that is, when an authority formally decides that 
the concrete data or document falls within the scope of a legal 
exception to the general rule of transparency. The 
denaturalization process thus transforms the content of 
information in a necessary, but not sufficient, condition of 
secrecy.  
That’s why denaturalization is indispensable for the limitation of 
secrecy. As long as secrecy remains a general standard, no one is 
really responsible for it and, therefore, one can hardly control it. 
Legal decisions, on the other hand, must fulfill a series of formal 
requirements and that enables control and review. Any attempt to 
withhold information without prior classification is invalid and 
the responsible authorities are then liable for the consequences of 
the illegal act. 
The question then turns to the list of requirements which must be 
met for a classificatory decision to be considered valid. That’s 
where the proceduralization of secrecy comes into play.  
 The Procedural izat ion  of Secrecy B)
Legal decisions imply some degree of discretionary power; 
otherwise, there may be application, but no decision. 
Discretionary power, however, is not arbitrary and must be 
exercised within the limits defined by law and in accordance with 
its goals. Proceduralization here means the definition of formal 
criteria along the deliberation process which enable external 
control, thus narrowing the discretionary power of the decision 
maker. 
                                                
9 Law n. 8.159, of January 8, 1991, article 23, §1º.  
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My analysis indicates that proceduralization of security-related 
secrecy in the Brazilian FOIA resorts to six main elements, which 
are expanded below: (i) narrow legal definitions; (ii) legal 
competence; (iii) justification; (iv) possibility of review; (v) 
publicity; and (vi) time limits. 
1)  Narrow legal  de f ini t ions   
The process of legal reasoning is often described as the 
application of an abstract rule to a set of facts. In the case of 
secrecy, since the right to information sets a presumption of 
publicity in its favor, the decision maker must evaluate whether or 
not the information under scrutiny falls within the scope of a 
legal exception.  
That means the degree of discretionary power attributed to the 
decision maker is proportional to the amplitude of the exceptions 
foreseen by the law. Undetermined legal definitions may be 
applied to a broader range of documents and data than narrow, 
concrete rules. Vagueness is, therefore, a great obstacle to the 
limitation of secrecy (PERLINGEIRO, 2015, p. 45). That’s why the 
principles of the right to information include the idea that any 
exceptions should be regulated in detail by the law (see footnote 6, 
above). 
When the Brazilian Constitution states information must be 
public, except when indispensable for the security of the State 
and the society,10 one can always point to the vagueness of such 
concept and wonder whether it is any guarantee at all for the 
freedom of information. In order to narrow that extremely broad 
definition, article 23 of the Brazilian FOIA determines that 
information can only be regarded as indispensable for security 
purposes when its disclosure may: (i) jeopardize national defense 
or sovereignty or the integrity of the national territory; (ii) harm 
or jeopardize the nation’s negotiations or international relations; 
(iii) jeopardize the life, safety or health of the population; (iv) 
represent significant risk to economic, financial or monetary 
stability, (v) harm or jeopardize strategic plans or operations from 
the Armed Forces; (vi) harm or jeopardize projects of research 
and scientific or technological development; (vii) jeopardize the 
safety of institutions or of national and foreign high authorities 
and their families; (viii) impair intelligence activities, as well as 
ongoing investigations related to prevention or repression of 
illegalities.  
According to the Brazilian FOIA, in order to classify any 
information, the authority must refer to at least one of these eight 
scenarios. It’s true that article 23 can still be accused of being too 
vague, since many of the adopted terms are extremely broad 
                                                
10 Article 5. […] XXXIII – all persons have the right to receive, from the public 
agencies, information of private interest to such persons, or of collective or general 
interest, which shall be provided within the period established by law, subject to 
liability, except for the information whose secrecy is essential to the security of society 
and of the State. 
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themselves, such as ‘economic stability’, ‘national sovereignty’ or 
‘safety of institutions’. Nonetheless, if compared to the general 
exception of ‘safety purposes’, article 23 provides narrower 
definitions which restrain the freedom of the decision maker.   
2)  Competence  
If the lawfulness of secrecy depends on a legal decision, who is 
entitled to make that decision? Just as important as narrowing the 
exception rules is the definition of the authorities that have the 
attribution to apply them, because, although seemly elementary, 
competence is a fundamental aspect in the limitation of secrecy. 
When information held by public agencies is presumed to be 
restricted, there is no one I can hold accountable for the 
withholding of information. Competence is, therefore, a premise 
of accountability. 
The Brazilian FOIA specifies which officials are entitled to 
classify information and to what extent. According to article 27, 
for a document to be considered top secret the classificatory 
decision must be approved by the president, the vice-president, a 
minister, a head of the Armed Forces or a chief of a diplomatic 
mission. The other security gradings (secret and confidential) are 
available to a wider range of authorities, but still very limited if 
compared to the size of the administration. Any withholding of 
information without the approval of the competent authority is 
invalid. As a result, by limiting the range of authorities entitled to 
classify information, the law creates obstacles for the trivialization 
of such decision.  
Competence and jurisdiction also enable liability. Not only is it 
considered a violation to withhold information without a lawful 
restriction by a competent authority, but also the classification of 
information for unlawful reasons (such as hiding the evidences of 
illegal action) may result in the removal of the authority from 
public service, in addition to civil and criminal liability.  
3)  Just i f i cat ion 
If the legal exceptions to transparency are relatively broad or 
vague, the mere indication by the authority that certain 
documents fall within its scope does not suffice. For external 
control to be effective, the classificatory decision must be 
justified, that is, it should explicitly demonstrate how the specific 
information is relevant for security purposes.  
The presentation of specific reasons for the withholding of 
information is widely acknowledged as a principle of the right to 
know. The Tshwane Declaration of Principles (see footnote 6, 
above), for instance, states that ‘the burden of demonstrating the 
legitimacy of any restriction rests with the public authority […]. 
In discharging this burden, it is not sufficient for a public 
authority simply to assert that there is a risk of harm; the 
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authority is under a duty to provide specific, substantive reasons 
to support its assertions’. 
The Brazilian law incorporated that idea, and article 24 prescribes 
that the classificatory decision must entail the reasons which 
justify it. The sole paragraph, however, allows that the decision be 
kept in secret for the same time of the classified information, 
which certainly hinders, or at least postpones, any possibility of 
social oversight. Nonetheless, the absence of justification can lead 
to the annulment of the classification, as well as to the liability of 
the competent authority.  
4)  Possibi l i ty  o f  Review 
The Tshwane Declaration of Principles also sustains that freedom 
of information legislation should include ‘prompt, full, accessible, 
and effective scrutiny of the validity of the restriction by an 
independent oversight authority and full review by the courts’. By 
submitting the classifying authority to independent review, either 
hierarchical or by the courts, the room for abuse and arbitrary 
withholding of information grows narrower. 
Brazilian legislation admits the possibility of review in at least 
three ways. First, any citizen can petition the authority responsible 
for the restriction, or its superior, to request reevaluation of the 
classified document, in accordance with article 29 of FOIA. In 
regard to information categorized as secret or top secret, article 
35 foresees the review by the Joint Committee on Information 
Reassessment, which consists of representatives from several 
ministries. Finally, although there is no specific provision in the 
FOIA, classificatory decisions are also subject to judicial review, 
as every other administrative act in Brazil. 
The existence of multiple review layers assures that the 
classificatory decision is not final or irrevocable, which greatly 
reduces the risk of abuse or unlawful withholding of information 
by public agencies. 
5)  Publi c i ty  
As contradictory as it may appear at first glance, the limitation of 
secrecy can only be achieved with some degree of publicity. The 
classified information itself, of course, must remain confidential, 
but the classificatory decision must be publicized, or else it would 
be impossible for society to identify unlawful withholding of 
information. After all, a citizen can only appeal against a 
classificatory decision if he knows it exists. 
As already mentioned, the Brazilian FOIA considers the 
classificatory decision itself secret (article 28). The existence of 
such act, however, must be made public. Article 30 demands that 
every public agency publish on its website a roster of every 
document classified in each grading (top secret, secret or 
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confidential), identified for future reference, as well as a list of all 
information declassified in the prior twelve months.11 
That active disclosure of information gives visibility to the extent 
of secrecy in public agencies. The monitoring of the development 
of such records through time provides society with a further 
indicator of the transparency policies of its government. 
6)  Temporal i ty  
The withholding of information for security reasons is 
instrumental, that is, it is justified by its utility to an end: protect 
society and institutions. Therefore, whenever that information 
ceases to be of significant impact on security, there is no longer a 
justification for the access restriction. The ultimate consequence 
of this idea is the abolition of eternal secrets. BOBBIO (1980) 
summarizes that conclusion: ‘one of the principles of a 
constitutional state: the public character is the rule, and secret is 
the exception, and even so an exception which doesn’t make the 
rule any less valid, for the secret is only justifiable if limited in 
time’. 
It is not always easy, of course, to determine when exactly 
information ceases to be indispensable for security purposes, and 
unlawful withholding of information, even if not eternal, can still 
produce a lot of harm. Nevertheless the definition of temporal 
limits contributes to restrain discretionary power, especially when 
authorities are expected to justify not only the classification of the 
document, but also the time imposed at the moment of the 
decision. 
In Brazil, article 24 of FOIA sets deadlines proportional to the 
security grading of information. Top secret documents may be 
withheld up to 25 years, whereas secret and confidential 
information only 15 and 5 years, respectively. As already 
mentioned, the grading influences also the definition of the 
competent authority for the classification, so that longer 
restrictions are usually a prerogative of higher ranks of the public 
administration. 
§ 3 – TRADE SECRETS IN BRAZILIAN SOES: THE 
ABSENCE OF PROCEDURES 
How about the regulation of trade secrets in SOEs? Does the 
Brazilian law provide similar or analogous procedural elements, 
which enable limitation of secrecy to exceptional circumstances? 
The answer appears to be negative. More than that, a closer look 
reveals that trade secrets haven’t gone through the process of 
denaturalization at all and are still, to a large extent, regarded as a 
                                                
11 Article 30 can be seen as the minimum compliance level to Principle 23 of the 
Tshwane Declaration exemplifies: ‘A public authority that holds information that it 
refuses to release should identify such information with as much specificity as possible. 
At the least, the authority should disclose the amount of information it refuses to 
disclose, for instance by estimating the number of pages’. 
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mere attribute of the information held. When it comes to 
commercial interests, there is no actual decision to be made: 
information simply is intrinsically secret. 
As a consequence, the withholding of information for economic 
purposes lacks all procedural elements which would enable 
external control. First of all, Brazilian law does not provide any 
specific definition of commercial secrets in SOEs. Article 22 of 
FOIA mentions briefly as a legitimate exception to freedom of 
information ‘the industrial secrets resulting from economic 
activities directly carried out by the state’. The definition of 
‘industrial secret’ is, however, extremely uncertain and is usually 
associated with information protected as intellectual property, 
such as patents or industrial designs.  
Another recent piece of legislation, the Statute of State-Owned 
Enterprises (Law 13.303, of June 30, 2016), states that ‘the criteria 
for the definition of what ought to be considered strategic, 
commercial or industrial secret will be set in an executive decree’ 
(article 86, §5). Such regulation, however, still doesn’t exist and 
the exact circumstances, which allow the restriction of 
information held by companies, remain imprecise.  
Likewise, since there is no decision to be made, there is no legal 
competence to the imposition of secrecy and it is unclear who is 
entitled to determine which documents or data may be disclosed 
and which are to be treated as secrets. Of course, the decision 
eventually has to be made, especially in response to FOIA 
requests, but at that point the restriction is not seen as an 
autonomous decision, rather as a mere fact.  
Since FOIA denials have to be justified and are subject to 
revision by the Ministry of Transparency, one could argue that 
the trade secrets are externally controllable. The justification in 
those cases, however, is usually vague and does not meet the 
requirements of classification for security purposes. Also, the 
ministry’s analysis, although partly restraining the discretionary 
power of the SOEs, often defers to the argument of the 
company, without further inquiry into the actual harm the 
disclosure of the information would provoke. 
Most importantly: the absence of an autonomous decision 
regarding trade secrets enables secrecy to remain both invisible 
and eternal. Because there is no need to ‘classify’ information, it is 
impractical to evaluate the extent of secrecy in SOEs and one can 
only find out if any given information is secret or not by means of 
a FOIA request. In addition to that, there are no time limits for 
trade secrets, even after they cease to be relevant for the 
company’s activities. 
Brazilian SOEs are expressly subject to FOIA. However, the 
possibility of invoking commercial interests for withholding 
information has led to the application of a peculiar transparency 
regime, which differs from other institutions controlled by the 
government. For instance: whereas the salaries of public officials 
are considered public and accessible information, according to a 
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ruling by the Supreme Court12, SOEs are dismissed from the 
disclosure of the same information regarding their employees.13 
The list of FOIA requests which were denied on the basis of 
trade secrecy includes: number and geographic distribution of 
employees, organizational chart, copy of contracts, value of sold 
assets, tax receipts from public procurements, records of board of 
administration’s meetings, work methodology, auditing reports14.  
CONCLUSIONS 
As a consequence of its hybrid public-private nature, State-
Owned Enterprises find themselves in a delicate situation when it 
comes to transparency. The challenge is to protect information 
relevant for the companies’ performances while at the same time 
maintain secrecy as an exceptional measure to be adopted only in 
limited circumstances. 
In the national security realm, Brazil sought to harmonize secrecy 
and transparency through the development of procedures which 
empower society to control decisions made by public officials 
responsible for the classification of relevant documents and 
information. Those different procedural elements act together to 
limit the discretionary power of authorities and to inhibit the 
unlawful expansion of secrecy. 
Secrecy in SOEs, on the other hand, hasn’t been the focus of the 
same attention by Brazilian lawmakers, and its regulation lacks 
almost all the elements which enable effective control by society. 
Even though that conclusion is limited to Brazil, it is not hard to 
imagine that many countries face similar problems, particularly 
those where SOEs are still significant actors in the economy.  
Trade secrets and security-related secrets are different and there is 
no reason to believe they should be regulated in equal terms. 
Nonetheless, the experience accumulated with information 
necessary for security purposes should not be overlooked, and it 
teaches us two valuable lessons.  
First, it is important to acknowledge secrecy as a consequence of 
a decision. Only by doing this can we bring it to the realm of 
accountability. Secondly, procedures play a major role in 
narrowing the discretionary power of authorities, thus 
diminishing the risk of abuse and illegitimate withholding of 
information. If trade secrets are to be harmonized with the 
principles of the freedom of information, lawmakers around the 
globe shouldn’t spare efforts in designing effective procedures 
                                                
12 Supremo Tribunal Federal, Recurso Extraordinário com Agravo n. 652.777, April 23, 
2015.  
13 A noteworthy exception is the State of São Paulo, which has publicized the salaries of 
SOEs’ employees on the internet since 2015.   
14 The requests and denials can be consulted in <http://bit.ly/2jmeJYy>. The 
mentioned cases were registered under the following protocol IDs: 
99903.000329/2014-78, 00190.024893/2013-11, 99923.000691/2015-91, 
00190.015163/2014-19, 00190.024892/2013-77, 00190.502923/2015-04, 
99909.000277/2013-07, 99923.000047/2015-13. 
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aimed at limiting secrecy to the exceptional circumstances in 
which it is justified, and only for the time it is actually necessary. 
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